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Attorneys’ fees fuel litigation, yet little is known about fees. Fee data are rarely
available in the United States or in English rule, loser-pays jurisdictions. This
Article analyzes fee awards in Israel, which vests judges with discretion to award
fees, with loser pays operating as a norm. The 2641 cases studied constitute nearly
all cases terminated by judgment in district courts in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.
Given many fee denials and fees that are well below client payments to attorneys
when awarded, the Israeli fee system could reasonably be characterized as being more
American than English. Moreover, judges use their discretion in a manner that
reflects redistributive sensitivity. Fees were awarded to prevailing parties in 72.8%
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of cases. Judges often exercised their discretion to protect losing litigants, especially
individuals, from having to pay fees. In tort cases won by individuals against
corporate defendants, corporations paid their own fees plus plaintiffs’ fees in 99% of
the cases; corporate defendants that prevailed in such cases paid their own fees 48%
of the time. Asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants existed. In cases with fee
awards, the mean and median fee paid to prevailing plaintiffs was 110,000 shekels
(NIS) and 31,000 NIS, respectively; the mean and median fee paid to prevailing
defendants was 49,000 NIS and 25,000 NIS, respectively. Plaintiffs prevailed in
54.8% of cases between individuals but received 90% of the fees. Expected award
amounts varied by case category and party status. Fees were significantly correlated
with damages recoveries in plaintiff victories and with time on the docket. In
contract and property cases, but not in tort cases, fees declined as a percent of
recovery as the recovery increased.
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INTRODUCTION
On the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate to recall the core principle of these Rules “to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of cases.1 The litigation
expense theme pervades the Rules,2 and the key litigation expense item is
attorneys’ fees, although the Rules do not specify generally applicable fee
rules. The Rules, like all of litigation, nevertheless operate in the shadow of
methods for paying attorneys. However, except for isolated pockets of legal
activity,3 little systematic knowledge exists of the fee patterns in the United
States or other countries. In the United States, this is in part because the
default American rule is that each party pays its own fees and fee amounts
usually remain private. Most other countries follow the English rule, under
which the losing party pays its opponents fees. In these countries, little
quantitative study of fees exists.
Despite this dearth of fee information, proposals to shift from the
American rule to the English rule often emerge as a way to reduce expense
and questionable litigation.4 The implications of such a shift for the operation of the Rules, and the entire litigation process, are substantial. It is
therefore helpful to examine fees in a legal system, such as Israel’s, in which
a loser-pays norm exists. The benefits of such an examination are at least
fivefold. First, systematic knowledge about actual fee practices in any
1
2
3

FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 16(f )(2), 23(g)-(h), 26(b)(2),(g), 41, 42, 54(d)(2), 58(e) & 68.
These include automobile accident cases in the United Kingdom and class action settlements, civil rights cases, and bankruptcy cases in the United States. See generally Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2010)]; Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2004)]; Paul Fenn & Neil
Rickman, Fixing Lawyers’ Fees Ex Ante: A Case Study in Policy and Empirical Legal Studies, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 533 (2011); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants
of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111
(2004); Stewart Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719
(1988). Early studies of fees are referred to in Herbert M. Kritzer, Empirical Legal Studies Before
1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925 (2009).
4 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, When Courts Determine Fees in
a System with a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 1452, 1455 (2013) (stating that the difference in actual operation between the American
and English rules is sufficiently blurred to call the dichotomy into question); Mathias Reimann,
Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis (arguing that “[t]he world of cost and fee
allocation in civil procedure is much better described as a broad spectrum” than a dichotomy), in
COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 3, 9 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012).
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jurisdiction is rare despite fees’ obvious importance. Second, information
about a loser-pays system’s operation informs the vast majority of countries
since they use such systems. Third, since loser-pays proposals often are on
the U.S. reform agenda, information from Israel can illuminate how such a
system might operate in the United States. Fourth, within Israel, little
systematic knowledge exists about how the attorneys’ fee system operates.
The Israeli bar and policymakers should have a direct interest in such a
study. Fifth, in Israel, judges have full discretion with regard to fee awards
and denials. This judge-centered allocation system can serve as an alternative to both the American and English rules. Interest in how a judgecentered system actually functions should transcend the countries using it.
Its functioning should interest countries concerned about fees and how they
might be reduced, made more certain or more flexible, or made fairer.
This Article reports the results of a study of four years of attorney fee
awards for nearly all district court cases litigated on the merits in Israel, a
total of 2641 cases. Three outcomes are of primary interest: the patterns of
fee grants and denials to winning and losing parties, the amount of fees
when awarded, and the relation between the awarded fee and the client
recovery in cases when plaintiffs prevailed and fees were awarded.
To summarize our findings, Israeli judges often exercised their discretion in a way that protects losing litigants, especially individuals. Israeli
judges denied fees to prevailing defendants in 29% of cases and to prevailing
plaintiffs in 26% of cases. In cases in which individual defendants lost, fees
were denied to successful plaintiffs 31% of the time, compared with 17%
denials in cases lost by corporate defendants. The fee denial rate to winning
plaintiffs was lowest in tort cases and was highest for winning defendants in
tort cases. Protection of individuals was common in tort cases between
individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants. In non-automobile accident
tort cases brought and won by individual plaintiffs, corporations had to pay
their own fees plus the plaintiffs’ fees 99% of the time. In cases won by the
corporate defendants, the defendants had to pay their own fees 48% of the
time. In one judicial district, Nazareth, individual plaintiffs were denied
fees in 82% of the property cases they won against individual defendants.
The mean fee award to winning plaintiffs was 113,000 shekels (NIS) (1
NIS equals approximately $0.27) compared to 49,000 NIS for winning
defendants. The median fee award to winning plaintiffs was 35,000 NIS
compared with 25,000 NIS for winning defendants. Excluding tort cases, in
which contingency fees are the norm for plaintiffs, these differences decrease, with the winning plaintiff median equal to 26,000 NIS and the
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winning defendant median equal to 25,000 NIS. Fee amounts were significantly
correlated with recovery amounts and with the time a case took to resolve.
Part I of this Article reviews relevant prior literature on fee rules and
describes our expectations about the results. Part II provides background
information about Israel’s legal system and its rules governing fees. Part III
describes our study’s data and our research methodology. Part IV reports
our results, which are discussed in Part V.
A preliminary word on terminology may be helpful. Legal systems
sometimes have different rules for amounts paid to attorneys (fees) and for
other litigation expenses, which are often referred to as costs. We use the
term “fees” for convenience, but the amounts we report are for the combined amounts of fees and costs.
I. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
The theoretical literature on attorneys’ fees has been reviewed elsewhere.5 That literature supplies few consistent predictions or prescriptions,6
and we instead focus on prior empirical results.
A. Rates of Fee Denials to Prevailing Parties
With the exception of our prior work on a smaller two-year Israeli sample,7
empirical literature does not addresses the quantitative pattern of fee awards
and denials in the mass of civil cases. A core motivation behind allowing fee
denials is the perceived negative effect of a loser-pays rule on potential
litigants with lower incomes.8 Litigants’ status as individuals, corporations,

5 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 334-39 (2013)
(reviewing theories developed with respect to attorneys’ fees clauses).
6 Id. at 339 (“Taken as a whole, the theoretical literature is indeterminate as to the practical
effects and social utility of attorney-fee regimes.”).
7 See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 4.
8 A loser-pays rule has been described as “a crude exclusion device the burden of which falls
disproportionately on individuals and community groups which do not have the same deep pockets
as governments and corporations.” Camille Cameron, The Price of Access to the Civil Courts in
Australia: Old Problems, New Solutions: A Commercial Litigation Funding Study, in COST AND FEE
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 59, 60 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) (footnote omitted); see
also Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 740-41 (2010) (stating that
low- and middle-income individuals are often “barred from pursuing their rights” under the
American rule). Limited litigation cost shifting may be superior to a full loser-pays system. See
Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of the
Loser-Pays Rule 13-14 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144800 (finding that the English rule is more
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public corporations, or governmental entities can be a rough proxy for
ability to pay. On average, corporations have a greater ability to pay than
individuals. Public corporations, on average, likely have greater resources
than private corporations or individuals. We therefore expect judges to
protect individuals more than corporations from fee awards and to protect
public corporations least of all. The government likely has greater ability to
pay than almost all other litigants, but it also differs from other litigants in
its financial incentives and in its litigation behavior.9 Therefore, we do not
have a clear expectation about how judges will treat the government in
allocating fees.
Our prior work did not analyze data on amounts of fees or client recoveries. The probability of a fee denial may decrease as the level of damages
awarded to plaintiffs increases. This is because damages are a measure of the
degree of harm caused by the defendant, and it is reasonable to believe that
the greater the harm caused, the greater the sentiment toward making the
plaintiff more fully whole by awarding fees as well as damages. This conjecture finds tangential support in U.S. punitive damages data. Although
punitive damages are infrequently awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, a strong
association exists between the amount of compensatory damages and the
probability of a punitive damages award.10 At the highest end of compensatory awards (those exceeding $10 million), the probability of a punitive
damages award when the plaintiff won at trial and sought punitive damages
was about 82%.11 Whether through punitive damages or awards of attorneys’
fees, decisionmakers may impose additional costs on defendants that cause
more harm.
The case category may also be associated with fee denial rates. Tort cases
have two distinctive features that may influence judges to make successful
tort plaintiffs whole by not denying them fees. First, tort plaintiffs usually
are victims in an accident involving a party with whom they did not seek to
deal. Unlike most contract and property interactions, little opportunity
effective than the American rule at encouraging “socially valuable litigation,” in which legal
uncertainties are resolved).
9 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of
the Case Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 94, 95 (2003) (“Government litigants, who need
not worry about profitable performance in the same manner as private litigants, and who operate
in a different institutional structure, are likely to have costs, broadly defined, that differ from
private litigants.”).
10 Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Nicole L. Waters & Martin T. Wells, The Decision to
Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 577, 617 (2010) (“Punitive
damages were rarely sought in tried cases, were frequently awarded when requested, and were
significantly associated with the level of the compensatory award.”).
11 Id. at 599.
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exists ex ante to avoid dealing with a counterparty. Second, tort plaintiffs
are on average less well off than contract and property plaintiffs. District
court plaintiffs in contract and property cases are usually people with
means. Otherwise they would not be in district court litigating contracts
worth more than 2.5 million NIS (the jurisdictional amount minimum)12 or
fighting over the ownership of real property. Tort plaintiffs, on the other
hand, are people who were injured badly (or they would not have filed their
claim in district court) and not necessarily people with substantial assets.
The institutional makeup of plaintiffs across case categories supports the
contention that tort plaintiffs likely have less wealth. Our data revealed that
about 85% of district court tort plaintiffs are individuals compared to 53% of
contract plaintiffs and 75% of property plaintiffs. We expect the involuntary nature of tort transactions, the lesser wealth of tort plaintiffs, and the
nature of their injury to leave judges more inclined to make successful tort
plaintiffs whole.
B. Levels of Fee Awards
With respect to award amounts, we expect them to vary based on the
time and effort in a case, the degree of success, and the plethora of factors
that courts and the legislature consider relevant in assessing fees.13 A central
determinant of fees should be the effort expended by the attorneys. The
1983 Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP) reported the hours devoted
by lawyers to cases in five federal courts and five state courts in the same
locales for cases terminated in 1978.14 The data are based on interviews with
12
13

See infra Section II.A.
For Israel’s list of factors incorporated in the Rules of Civil Procedure and legal doctrine,
see infra Section II.B. A frequently cited list of such factors in the United States is in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing twelve factors for assessing
the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees award), overruled in part by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87 (1989) (holding that the Johnson factors were useful but that an attorney’s private fee arrangement was not a dispositive factor in determining whether a fee award was reasonable). In statutory
fee-shifting cases, the Supreme Court has shifted the focus almost exclusively to reasonable hours
worked times reasonable hourly fee. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1670,
1672-73, 1676-77 (2010) (reversing 75% enhancement of attorney’s fees as essentially arbitrary, and
holding that enhancements require specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been
adequate to attract competent counsel); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1992)
(giving unenhanced lodestar under fee-shifting environmental statutes). See generally 7B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1803-1803.2 (3d ed. 2005) (detailing the power courts have to award fees in class
actions and under what circumstances).
14 2 DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT
PART A at II-70, II-70 tbl.II-4-C (1983) [hereinafter CLRP] (“Cases with higher stakes tend to
require and justify a greater investment of lawyer time.”).
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719 lawyers in 564 separate cases.15 Cases with higher stakes required greater
expenditures of time for both hourly and contingent fee lawyers.16 A similar
relation was observed in United Kingdom automobile accident cases.17
Additional reasons support expecting a positive correlation between client
recoveries and attorneys’ fees. First, higher recoveries may be associated
with attorneys’ relative performances in cases. Higher recoveries may reflect
both greater success than lower recoveries and greater investment of time. A
strong association between fees and client recovery has repeatedly been
found in class action settlements, in which the court must approve the
reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel.18 The increase in
fee awards as recoveries increased was so regular in United Kingdom
automobile accident cases that the empirically observed correlation became
the basis for setting a mandatory fee schedule based on the recovery amount.19
Second, from a psychological perspective, the presence of higher recoveries
and damages in a case may have an anchoring effect. Exposure to larger
numbers, whether relevant or not to the task at hand, can induce the
production of higher numbers in many contexts.20 In the legal context,
amounts of economic and noneconomic damages are highly correlated, as
are amounts of punitive and compensatory damages.21 Whether or not

15
16

Id. at II-12 (describing the study’s methodology).
Id. at II-71, II-71 tbl.II-4-D (“The more complex a case, the more time lawyers are likely to
spend on it.”).
17 Fenn & Rickman, supra note 3, at 549-52 (suggesting that Britain’s “Fixed Recoverable
Cost Scheme” has “resulted in an increase of around 50 percent in the likelihood of litigation over
noncost matters”).
18 Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 3, at 279 (“[The percentage fee method for awarding
fees in class actions] appears to be the dominant de facto method used and best explains the
pattern of awards.”); Eisenberg & Miller (2004), supra note 3, at 76 (“The single most important
factor determining the fee is the size of the client’s recovery.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 845
(2010) (finding that district courts typically calculate fee awards using the “highly discretionary
percentage-of-the-settlement method,” and such awards “were strongly and inversely associated
with the size of the settlement”).
19 Britain adopted its “Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme for Low Value Road Traffic Accidents” in response to concerns about increasing legal costs. Fenn & Rickman, supra note 3, at 534
(describing the Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme, which determines the costs available to
successful lawyers in road traffic accident claims under £10,000).
20 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative
Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 143-45 (2011) (arguing that
anchors have an impact on jury assessments of damages).
21 See id. (finding that the amount of economic damage serves as a “guidepost for jurors” and
that there is a “strong connection between compensatory and punitive damages”).
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judges are less affected by anchoring than nonprofessionals, evidence exists
of anchoring effects on judges.22
The case category may also be associated with factors influencing fee
awards. In the CLRP lawyer survey, there was no meaningful difference in
the median hours spent by hourly lawyers across tort, contract, and property
cases.23 But contingent-fee lawyers expended more than twice the median
hours on tort cases than they expended on property cases,24 even though
contingent-fee and hourly lawyers spent about the same amount of time on
tort cases.25 Contingent fees are said to be as common in Israel as they are
in the United States and to be primarily used in the same areas of law,
mostly tort.26 Given the risk and extra hours associated with contingency
fees, we might expect higher fees for plaintiffs in tort cases than in other
cases. The standard contingency fee rate in Israel is 20%-25%, with 20%
being the most common rate,27 which should influence the relationship
between fee and recovery. Israeli law also has a specific rule relating to fees
in automobile tort cases. The law caps the contingency fee at 13% of the
recovery if the case reaches judgment.28 Therefore, one needs to account
separately for automobile cases.
Work by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) also helps
inform expectations about fee award levels across case categories. Based on
a 2012 survey of the American Board of Trial Advocates, the NCSC reported fees of cases litigated to trial for several case categories.29 A definite
hierarchy emerged. Median fees were highest in professional malpractice
cases ($122,000), followed by contract cases, employment cases, real property

22 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 790-94 (2001) (outlining results of a study that demonstrate that judges
were impacted by the presence of an anchor condition when evaluating damage awards).
23 See CLRP, supra note 14, at II-70 tbl. II-4-C (showing approximately 30 hours for each
area of law).
24 See id. (finding that contingent fee lawyers spent a median of 30.3 hours on tort cases and
12.5 hours on property cases).
25 See id. (finding that contingent fee lawyers spend a median of 30.3 hours on tort cases and
that hourly lawyers spent a median of 29.6 hours).
26 See Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys’ Contingent Fees: A Behavioral Analysis, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 254 (2010) (“Contingent-fee arrangements are as prevalent
in Israel as they are in the United States and are regularly used in the same areas of law.”).
27 Id. at 255 n.10.
28 Road Accident Victims Compensation Law, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 311, § 16 (1974–1975) (Isr.).
29 See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Na’l Ctr. for State Courts, Estimating the
Cost of Civil Litigation, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, Jan. 2013, at 1, 7, available at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/Publications/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20
PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx (showing cost of litigation by case type, such as automobile, employment, and malpractice).
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cases, and premises liability cases.30 Median fees were lowest in automobile
tort cases ($43,000).31 The NCSC data suggest that the specific area within
tort law is a more important determinant of fees than the fact that a case is a
tort case. Public corporations, private corporations, and individuals likely
have differing capacities to pay fees. Their relative wealth might influence
both the level of fee awards and whether fees are awarded.
C. Fees as a Percent of Recovery
A separate question from the relationship between the amount of client
recovery and the fee amount is the issue of the fee as a percentage of the
recovery. The recovery amount to fee amount relationship could be a
constant percentage, similar to the oversimplified description of the onethird contingency fee in U.S. tort law. But the fee as a percentage of the
recovery might also increase or decrease as the recovery grows. An increasing percentage gives the lawyer a stronger incentive to obtain the marginal
recovery dollar. A decreasing percentage introduces an economy of scale,
which is especially relevant, and frequently observed,32 in aggregate litigation such as class actions. The Israel Bar Association’s suggested minimum
tariff rates recommend a declining percentage as claims amounts increase.33
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT ISRAEL’S LEGAL SYSTEM
Understanding Israel’s relevant institutional framework is necessary to
comprehend this study. This Article focuses on fees at the trial court level in
Israel’s district courts, and thus we limit the institutional description of
Israel’s court system to those aspects that are most relevant to this study. We
then describe Israel’s rules on the allocation of fees.
A. Israel’s Trial Court System
Israel is a unitary state with a single system of courts of general jurisdiction.34 Among the courts of general jurisdiction, Israel’s judiciary law
establishes a hierarchy of three levels with the Israel Supreme Court (ISC)

30
31
32

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 3 (showing that, due to scaling effects, fees
as a percent of recovery decrease as the recovery amount increases).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 66-68.
34 Unless otherwise noted, this description of the Israeli judiciary is based on Eisenberg,
Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 4.
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at the top, district courts below it, and magistrates’ courts at the bottom.35
District courts and magistrates’ courts function as trial courts, while the
ISC functions both as an appellate court and as the High Court of Justice
(HCJ).36 In its HCJ capacity, the court operates as a court of first and last
instance, primarily in areas relating to government behavior.37
Twenty-nine magistrates’ courts operate as Israel’s basic trial courts and
serve the locality and district in which they sit. They have civil jurisdiction
over matters involving up to a specified monetary amount—currently 2.5
million NIS—as well as over the use, possession, and division of real
property.38 District courts have residual jurisdiction over matters not within
the sole jurisdiction of another court. The six district courts sit in Jerusalem,
Tel Aviv, Haifa, Be’er-Sheva, Nazareth, and Petah Tikva (since 2012, in
Lod).39 District courts have civil jurisdiction over matters with more than
2.5 million NIS in dispute and commonly adjudicate cases involving
business companies and partnerships, arbitration, and prisoner petitions.
District courts also serve as administrative law courts.40 Generally, a single
district court judge presides over trial.41 This study is limited to cases
originating in the district courts.
Court filing fees in Israel can be much more substantial than in the
United States.42 Higher fees, which impose higher ex ante litigation costs,
35 See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) (Isr.)
(outlining civil law procedure regulations).
36 See Menachem Hofnung & Keren Weinshall-Margel, Judicial Setbacks, Material Gains:
Terror Litigation at the Israeli High Court of Justice, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 664, 669 (2010)
(noting that the HCJ’s “original and final” jurisdiction in matters beyond the jurisdiction of other
courts paves the way for litigation between the public and policymakers).
37 Id. at 669-70 (noting the court’s jurisdiction over “petitions concerning national security
where the respondents are almost always cabinet ministers, agencies entrusted with security
powers, or the Israeli army”).
38 Magistrates’ courts also serve as traffic courts, municipal courts, family courts, and small
claims courts. Generally, a single judge presides over each case unless the President of the
Magistrates’ Court directs that a panel of three judges should hear a particular case. See generally
Courts Law (Consolidated Version), supra note 35, § 47.
39 The Petah-Tikva court was established in 2007 and moved to Lod in 2012. Ordinances of
Courts (Establishment of The Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824 (Isr.).
40 District courts also hear appeals from judgments of the magistrates’ courts.
41 A panel of three judges hears appeals from magistrates’ court judgments and also sits when
the President or Deputy President of the District Court so directs. See Courts Law (Consolidated
Version), supra note 35, § 37. Our data do not include any cases with a three-judge panel.
42 Civil case filing fees in the United States tend to be relatively small. The filing fee to
commence a civil action in federal court is $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012). For a list of state
court filing fees, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL
COURTS, APRIL, 2012, http://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/budget-resource-center/
~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/
Civil%20Filing%20Fees%20April%202012.ashx.
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likely exert greater influence over the nature of cases that are filed in court
than do fees in the United States. Filing fees for monetary claims in Israeli
general civil courts are 2.5% of the value of the relief sought, including a
minimum fee that is currently 758 NIS, approximately 217 U.S. dollars. For
claims over 24,235,382 NIS, the filing fee percent declines to 1% of the
claim.43 Thus, filing fees in monetary damages cases can be several thousand
dollars. Filing fees in nonmonetary relief cases—such as suits for declaratory relief, contempt of court, or derivative suits—as well as in personal injury
suits, are fixed by the Court Rules (Court Fees) of 2007 and are updated
from time to time.44 Several exceptions to the requirement to pay filing fees
exist and are based either on a litigant’s financial hardship or on the nature of
the claim filed. For example, courts will exempt plaintiffs in full or in part
on a showing of financial inability to pay the fee.45 Courts apply this
exemption narrowly, however, and an applicant for relief must demonstrate
not only inadequate personal financial resources, but also the unavailability
of financial assistance from other sources, such as family members.46
Exemptions from, or reductions of, filing fees based on the nature of the
claim filed include such cases as prisoner petitions, government takings and
many others.47
B. Israel’s Law on Attorneys’ Fees
Israeli law governing fees differs from that of most countries except
South Africa and, to some extent, India,48 in that allocation decisions are
left almost entirely to the court’s discretion.49 The rules regulating attorneys’
fees50 are specified in the 1984 Rules of Civil Procedure (RCP).51 The
43
44

Second Supplement of the Court Rules (Court Fees), 2007, § 8 (Isr.).
See id. at § 2 (filing fee for bodily injury cases filed in magistrates’ court is 6592 NIS); id.
at § 3 (filing fee for declaratory relief cases filed in magistrates’ court is 633 NIS); id. at § 9 (filing
fee for bodily injury cases filed in district court is 41,203 NIS); id. at § 10 (filing fee for declaratory
relief cases filed in district court is 1115 NIS). Specialized courts and tribunals—such as family
courts, labor courts, small claims courts, and the like—are governed by special rules with respect to
filing fees.
45 See id. § 14.
46 See TA 511/98 Fuks v. Discount Bank LTD (unpublished, June 9, 1999) (Isr.); BS 494/95
Shimoni v. Shimoni (unpublished, Mar. 23, 1995) (Isr.).
47 See Second Supplement of the Court Rules §§ 3, 9 & 20.
48 See generally Reimann, supra note 4 (undertaking a comparative view of litigation costs,
particularly for attorneys involved in “transboundary cases”).
49 Although there are several supreme court cases, discussed below, that purport to guide the
judges to use certain criteria in awarding fees, district courts mentioned such guiding cases in less
than three percent of our sample.
50 Although the Rules of Civil Procedure treat court costs and attorneys’ fees jointly using
the term “expenses,” the supreme court has urged judges to rule separately on court costs and
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fundamental litigation fee allocation rule, Rule 511, grants courts wide
discretion concerning whether to award fees and the amount awarded and
subjects this discretion to a limited set of guidelines prescribed in Rule 512.
Israel does not have a developed market for insurance to protect against
attorneys’ fees a party may have to pay in litigation.
The rules instruct courts to base their fee rulings on, among other
things, the amount or value of the relief asked for by the plaintiff and the
remedy granted by the court. They also authorize the courts to consider the
parties’ behavior during trial. Although not mandated by law, judges in
practice usually follow the loser-pays rule.52 Judges can, and sometimes do,
order winning parties to pay losing parties’ fees.53 In terms of the amounts
awarded, many believe that a transformation has taken place over time.
Historically, courts tended to disregard completely the actual amounts
expended by winning parties, leading, in all likelihood, to undercompensation.54 In recent years, following the “constitutional revolution,”55 which
constitutionalized to a certain extent civil procedure, both those within and
without the judicial system have increasingly argued that fees awarded
should be more in line with parties’ actual fees.56

attorneys’ fees, because one must add value-added tax (VAT) to attorneys’ fees, which should not
be included in the amount payable as court costs. See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. Siat “Yesh
Atid Lebiyalik,” 60(1) PD 391 [2005] (Isr.). It should be noted, however, that not all judges follow
the Supreme Court’s recommendation. In cases in which fees were denied, the prevailing party
received neither costs nor fees.
51 See generally Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984, KT 4685, 2220 (Isr.).
52 See URI GOREN, CIVIL PROCEDURE ISSUES 721-22 (11th ed. 2013).
53 See, e.g., CA (Jer) 35178-09-12 Morgenstern v. Drinking Bottles Collection Corp. 1, 15
(unpublished 2013) (Isr.).
54 This is our impression of the prevalent supposition in the legal community. See also
LOVELLS, AT WHAT COST? A LOVELLS MULTI J URISDICTIONAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION
COSTS
110-11,
http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/c940bb4b-a67f-4e63-a5b8ced6198b2125/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fff33267-29d5-4230-a140-cf2eeb7d4a05/
LitigationCostsReport.pdf (displaying results of a study of 50 jurisdictions and their associated
costs, including recoverability of costs and interest on costs).
55 See Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the
Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REV. 299, 310 (2003–2004) (“The
enactment of the 1992 basic laws [Basic Law: Human Dignity and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation] underlies the claim that Israel has undergone a ‘constitutional revolution,’ transforming
it from a parliament-supremacy type democracy (similar to the UK) to a constitutional democracy
(like most other Western democracies) where human rights serve as powerful ‘trumps.’”).
56 See SHLOMO L EVIN, THE THEORY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE : INTRODUCTION AND
BASIC PRINCIPLES (2008).
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A 2005 Israel Supreme Court (ISC) Registrar57 decision, though not
binding, instructed judges to award winning parties their actual fees unless
the award would unreasonably impair access to justice and equality or cause
over-deterrence.58 A subsequent ISC decision explained that awarding the
winning party its actual fees is intended to prevent financial loss by the
winning party, to deter potential plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims, and
to discourage potential defendants from defending against a rightful suit.59
However, the court continued that the actual fees must be subject to them
being “reasonable, proportional and necessary for the litigation.”60 This
limitation is intended to avoid over-deterrence, prevent inequality between
rich and poor parties, inhibit inappropriate increases in the cost of litigation, and foster access to justice.61
Another ISC decision specified some of the factors judges should consider when awarding fees: the character of the suit and its complexity, the
requested relief and its proportionality to the relief actually granted, the
amount of work invested by the award recipient in the litigation, the actual
amount paid or payable as attorneys’ fees, and the behavior of the requesting party during the litigation.62
Notwithstanding these decisions, it is clear to those acquainted with Israeli civil litigation that fee awards do not reflect the parties’ actual expenditures during the litigation in the majority of the cases.63 This is in part
because courts do not know what the parties’ actual fees were. Parties
requesting an award of fees are not required to, and rarely do, introduce
evidence of the actual amounts they had to expend on the litigation.64 In
57 The ISC Registrar is a magistrate court judge who sits at the ISC and handles certain
procedural issues, such as requests for filing fee exemptions, petitions to join parties, and questions
of appellate jurisdiction.
58 See HCJ 891/05 Tnuva Cent. Coop. for the Mktg. of Agric. Produce in Isr. Ltd. v. The
Auth. for the Licensing of Imports 1, 5 [2005] (Isr.).
59 See CA 6793/08 Loare Ltd. v. Meshulam Levinshtein Contracting & Eng’g Ltd. 1, 12
[2009] (Isr.).
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. Siat “Yesh Atid Lebiyalik,” 60(1) PD 391 [2005] (Isr.).
63 See LOVELLS, supra note 54, at 110-11 (providing questions and answers on the topic of fee
recovery in Israel).
64 In 2002, the ISC’s president, Justice Aharon Barak, issued administrative guidance regarding
the award of attorneys’ fees. According to the guidance, judges, when calculating attorneys’ fees,
are allowed to take into account the written retainer agreement between the party and her attorney
that was introduced into evidence by the attorney during trial or as an annex to the written
summations. The second part of the guidance qualifies this instruction by stating that attorneys are
by no means obligated to introduce retainer agreements into evidence nor are courts obligated to
take them into account when calculating fee awards. See SUPREME COURT ISR., ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME C OURT 1/98, CALCULATING
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our data, a fee agreement with a client was submitted in only four cases.65
These common practices seem to limit implementing the more recent
emphasis on awarding actual fees to parties.
The Israel Bar Association has a schedule of recommended, but not
binding, minimum tariffs. For monetary claims in courts, the recommended
minimum starts at 15% of the claim amount.66 For claims above 91,140 NIS
up to 895,630 NIS, the recommendation is 10% of 91,140 NIS plus 4% of the
claim amount above 91,140 NIS.67 For claims above 895,630, the amount is
as agreed between attorney and client but not less than 41,690 NIS.68 For
tort claims with contingent fees, other than road accidents, the recommended minimum starts at 15% of the recovery and has a top rate of 10% of the
adjudicated amount for recoveries above 342,650 NIS.69 For roadway
accidents, the Compensation for Victims of Road Accidents Law imposes a
maximum fee of 13% of the amount awarded by judgment.70
In summary, the RCP and other guidance provided to Israeli judges embody considerations similar to those in theoretical discussions of optimal
litigation cost allocation rules—considerations such as avoiding financial loss
to prevailing parties, deterring frivolous litigation, promoting defendant

ATTORNEY FEES (2002). In 2010, Justice Barak’s successor, President Justice Dorit Beinish,
issued an amendment to the administrative guidance:
[A]s a general rule, the attorney fees to be awarded should approximate the actual
costs expended on the litigation, subject to their being reasonable, proportional and
necessary under the circumstances. In this regard, each party is allowed to introduce . . . the written retainer agreement between that party and her attorney, as
well as proof of any money paid as attorney fees.
SUPREME COURT ISR., GUIDELINES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(2010), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/dover/html/hanchayot_new.pdf. The second part
of the Barak administrative guidance remained in place, however. See id.
65 This is consistent with conversations we held with numerous attorneys and judges suggesting
that, in practice, retainer agreements are rarely introduced into evidence.
66 ISRAEL BAR ASS’N, BAR ASSOCIATION RULES (RECOMMENDED MINIMUM TARIFF)
2000, available at www.israelbar.org.il/uploadFiles/
Bar_Association_Rules_(Recommended_Minimum_Tariff)_english_nov_2008.pdf. Amounts are
to be adjusted for inflation.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Road Accident Victims Compensation Law, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 311, § 16 (1974–1975)
(Isr.); see also LOVELLS, supra note 54, at 110 (“[T]he Bar Association Regulations determine the
maximum fee rates in motor vehicle accident claims . . . [such as] 13% of [the] amount awarded by
judgment.”).
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reasonableness, promoting fair access to the justice system, avoiding over
deterrence, and making awards correspond to effort expended.71
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
A. Data and Methodolog y
The data used here consist of civil cases filed under the original jurisdiction of the five district courts that existed in Israel in 2005 and 2006, and
the six district courts that existed in 2011 and 2012.72 We included only civil
cases that reached final decisions on the merits. The study includes every
case decided in the four years for which an opinion was available online via
the Dinim website.73 Dinim is a private company that offers attorneys and
other paying clients access to case information. Using the Dinim database
led us to focus our inquiry on 2005 and 2006 because these are the first two
years for which the database is supposedly comprehensive regarding district
court decisions.74 Prior to those years, we could not be sure that the selection of cases by Dinim did not generate selection bias. The more recent
years substantially increase the sample size and allow us to assess change
over time. Our sample consists of 2641 cases.
We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the Dinim database by
comparing it with data obtained from Israel’s official court system website
Net Hamishpat.75 Although Net Hamishpat does not provide information
relating to all district courts operating in 2005 and 2006, the partial data
that it does provide suggest that the data obtained from the Dinim website
are indeed comprehensive and accurate. The data thus provide a complete
picture of district court civil case activity in the periods covered and a sound
basis for assessing how the courts rule with respect to fees in civil cases.
The data are subject to some limitations. First, the study covers only
final decisions in civil matters, thus omitting cases terminated via settlement, dismissal, or judgment by way of settlement under § 79A of the
71 See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees (discussing “whether a move to fuller
indemnification would raise or lower the total costs of litigation . . . [or] better align those costs
with any social benefits they might generate”), in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND E CONOMICS:
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 63, 64-65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000).
72 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (referring to the 2007 establishment of the Petah
Tikva court).
73 DINIM, http://www.dinimveod.co.il (last visited May 12, 2014).
74 Telephone interview with Adv. Michal Vinograd, General Manager, Dinim (June 2011).
75 NET HAMISHPAT, https://www.court.gov.il/NGCS.Web.Site/HomePage.aspx (last visited
May 12, 2014).
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Courts’ Act.76 Second, the study excludes interlocutory decisions. This
exclusion is significant because often judges award fees to parties who
prevail in interlocutory decisions and, therefore, looking only at final
decisions provides a partial picture of fees awarded in tried cases. Third, the
study includes only district court cases and excludes magistrates’ courts,
ISC cases, and cases from specialized courts such as family courts, rabbinical
courts, labor courts, and military courts.
Student research assistants coded cases, which were randomly sampled
for accuracy by a second tier of more experienced students. Prior to the
student coding, the Authors designed a data form to structure the coding.
The performance of the form and the students were reviewed in an initial
set of cases, the form was revised in light of that experience, and a final
form was constructed. The students used that revised form to code the cases
under the supervision of the Authors.
B. Descriptive Statistics
To explore the relations among the outcomes of interest—denials of fee
awards, amount of fee awards, and the relation between recoveries and fee
awards—we account for several factors about the cases and the parties. Case
characteristics include the case category, the recovery amount in cases won
by plaintiffs, time on the docket, whether the parties had counsel, and the
court that adjudicated the case. For case categories, we used the first claim
in a case to characterize the case as one of ten civil case categories. For
parties, we coded for whether plaintiffs and defendants were individuals,
corporations, or government entities, as well as the ethnicity of individual
litigants as Arab or Jewish. We used the first named plaintiff and defendant
to code party status. For time on the docket, we used docket numbers to
estimate the date of filing. Since the district court docket numbering system
changed during the years studied, we used different estimation methods to
exploit the information embodied in the varying docket number systems.77
76 See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, §79A (1983-1984) (Isr.)
(outlining civil law procedure regulations).
77 For newer style document numbers, we used the year a case was filed and determined the
month a case was filed from its docket number, which includes the month of filing. We estimated
the date of filing using the order and the number of filings in a district in a month. This method
was used for 633 cases. For earlier style docket numbers, which do not include the month of filing,
we estimated the date of filing by using the docket numbers, which are sequential within each
district and year. We thus know the order in which the cases were filed but not the exact date. For
years in which the number of civil filings was known, we estimated the date of filing using the
order and number of filings in a district in a year. To illustrate, if the data included one case filed
in a district in a year, we assigned it a mid-year filing date. If the data included two cases filed in a
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In 5.1% of the cases, a fee was or may have been awarded to a losing party.
These cases fall into three categories. The first consists of cases in which the
winning party’s misbehavior led the court to award the losing party fees.78
The second includes cases involving multiple parties with the plaintiff or
plaintiffs having succeeded as to some defendants but not as to other
defendants. Since we analyzed the data at the case level rather than the
individual litigant level, some of these cases may be ones that should be
counted as following a loser-pays rule, but they also may be ones in which a
losing party received a fee. The third contains cases in which it is not clearcut who the winning party actually was. These are cases in which the court
accepted the winning party’s claims only in (sometimes small) part. It is not
clear whether in such cases courts should be characterized as not applying a
loser-pays rule. By characterizing the second and third categories of cases as
ones in which a loser may have received a fee, we slightly understate the rate
at which the loser-pays rule was applied. That leaves us with unambiguous
outcomes of loser pays or no one pays for 95% of the cases. We leave further
analysis of the 5.1% of the cases with possible payments to losing parties for
future work. For purposes of summarizing fee amounts, we exclude the
2.95% of cases in which no defense was offered on the merits and report
summary statistics that exclude cases with no fee awards to the prevailing
party and cases in which the losing party may have received a fee.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. The
table shows the number (via the mean value of the case category variables)
of cases in each category. About 84% of the sample consists of three major
civil case categories, coded as contract, property, and tort (including automobile cases). These and most other case categories involve the kinds of
cases brought in most legal systems, but some reflect distinctive features of
Israeli law.
Since 2000, most cases that deal with administrative law are under the
jurisdiction of either Israel’s specialized administrative courts or the ISC in
its HCJ capacity. Our sample does not include ISC or HCJ cases. Regular
district in a year, we assigned the first case a filing date one-third into the year and the second case
a filing date two-thirds into the year. If the data included fifty cases filed in a district in a year, we
assigned equally spaced filing dates, beginning with the seventh day of the year (365/50, rounded)
as the first filing date. This method was used in 1121 cases. For years in which the number of civil
filings was not known, we estimated the date of filing using the order and number of filings in the
cases in our data in a district in a year. This method was used in 859 cases. For 11 cases filed and
terminated in the same year, the estimation of the day of case filing yielded negative time on the
docket. In those cases, the time on the docket was replaced by the mean time on the docket for the
145 cases in our data that had positive time estimates and were filed and terminated in the same
year (0.33 years). The data contained the date of termination so no estimation of that date was needed.
78 For an example of such a case, see supra note 53.
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civil courts, including district courts, have residual administrative law
jurisdiction and deal mostly with restitution claims in administrative
matters. These claims are a small minority of cases on the administrative docket.
With respect to arbitration cases, the Arbitration Act of 1968 allows the
parties to arbitration to resort to court during the arbitration process or
following its conclusion. During the arbitration, the court has the power to
intervene in various procedural aspects of the arbitration.79 But the most
significant and prevalent jurisdiction of courts is to invalidate a final
arbitration decision for reasons specified in the Arbitration Act.80
Expropriation cases involve government condemnation of property and
the usual structure of the case is for an individual or corporation to sue a
government to contest the matter. This party structure accounts for about
87% of the expropriation cases. Nonmonetary relief was sought in 50.8% of
the cases, which helps account for the number of cases in which a recovery
amount and fee percent were not observed.
Distribution of case categories varied between districts. Contract cases
dominated in Tel Aviv (comprising 37% of the docket), tort cases (including
auto cases) dominated in Jerusalem (comprising 35% of the docket), and
property cases dominated in Nazareth and Petah Tikva (comprising 58%
and 35% of the docket, respectively). In Haifa, tort and property cases each
accounted for about 33% of the docket. Cases were most evenly distributed
across the major case categories in Be’er-Sheva, where the major categories
ranged from about 25% to 28% of the docket.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Outcomes
Fee denied to
winner
Fee amount
Fee as percent of
recovery
Recovery amount
Plaintiff won
Plaintiff prevailed
in whole
Case characteristics
Admin. Law
Arbitration

Obs.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

2528

0.272

0

0.445

0

1

1167
307

83,144
19.5

30,000
13.1

216,740
28.5

1017
0.8

4,000,000
250.3

731
2641
2641

1,806,317
0.611
0.329

872,488
0
0

2,841,958
0.488
0.470

1498.2
0
0

35,800,000
1`
1`

2641
2641

0.017
0.025

0
0

0.131
0.155

0
0

1
1

79 Arbitration Law, 5728-1968, 22 LSI 210, § 16 (1967–1968) (Isr.) (outlining potential action a
court may take during an arbitration).
80 See id. § 24 (listing ten bases for setting aside or modifying an arbitration award).
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Banking
2641
Contract
2641
Corporations
2641
Expropriation
2641
Other
2641
Property
2641
Tort
2641
Tort, auto
2641
Years on docket
2613
Pltf. Represented
2637
Deft. Represented
2639
Plaintiff–Defendant characteristics
Ind. v. Ind.
2638
Ind. v. Corp.
2638
Ind. v. Govt.
2638
Corp. v. Ind.
2638
Corp. v. Corp.
2638
Corp. v. Govt.
2638
Govt. v. Ind.
2638
Govt. v. Corp.
2638
Govt. v. Govt.
2638
Public corp. pltf.
2641
Public corp. deft.
2641
Foreign corp. pltf. 2641
Foreign corp. deft. 2641
District
Be’er-Sheva
2641
Haifa
2641
Jerusalem
2641
Nazareth
2641
Petah Tikva
2641
Tel Aviv
2641
Year case ended
2005
2641
2006
2641
2011
2641
2012
2641

0.020
0.272
0.038
0.017
0.045
0.298
0.174
0.093
4.08
0.937
0.823

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.78
1
1

0.142
0.445
0.192
0.131
0.207
0.457
0.379
0.290
2.76
0.242
0.382

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
22.8
1
1

0.329
0.246
0.110
0.079
0.139
0.055
0.022
0.014
0.006
0.044
0.101
0.032
0.011

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.470
0.431
0.312
0.270
0.347
0.229
0.147
0.116
0.075
0.205
0.302
0.176
0.106

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.054
0.298
0.133
0.091
0.070
0.354

0
0
0
0
0
0

0.226
0.458
0.339
0.287
0.255
0.478

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

0.223
0.209
0.304
0.264

0
0
0
0

0.417
0.406
0.460
0.441

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Note: Fee amount and fee percent include cases in which the winning party was awarded fees in
which a defense was offered. Fee percent includes only cases with nonzero fee awards and nonzero
recovery amounts. Amounts are in 2012 NIS.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

IV. RESULTS
We first report results for denials of fee awards and then report results
for the amount of fees, conditional on the award of fees. Accounting for
which party prevailed at trial is important because fee denial rates are
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highly correlated with whether plaintiffs or defendants win.81 Where
relevant, we therefore present results stratified by the winning party.
A. Denials of Fee Awards
Table 2 shows substantial asymmetries in the rates of fee denials to winning parties. Of the three large case categories, contract and tort cases had
higher rates of fee denial in cases where defendants won than in cases where
plaintiffs won. The difference in tort cases is striking, with fee denials to
winning defendants in 40% of the cases and fee denials to winning plaintiffs
in only 9% of the cases. The pattern is similar in the largest subcategory of
tort cases, automobile cases. In property cases, the difference reverses, with
winning plaintiffs denied fees at a higher rate than winning defendants.
Automobile cases also have a noticeably different win rate, in which defendants won only 11% of adjudicated cases due to the no-fault regime that
governs such cases. The 89% success rate for plaintiffs is due to their having
to prove damages rather than liability. In such cases, even if the plaintiff
receives much lower damages than requested, it is coded in our data as a win
for the plaintiff.82
Table 2: Rate of Fee Denial by Case Category and Prevailing Party
Defendant won
Category

Admin. Law
Arbitration
Banking
Contract
Corporations
Expropriation
Property
Tort

81
82

Number
won
25
32
28
310
42
17
271
224

%
won
54.4
49.2
51.9
43.1
41.6
37.0
34.5
48.7

Plaintiff won
Proportion
of fee
denials of
cases won
0.32
0.13
0.04
0.30
0.24
0.36
0.25
0.40

Proportion
Number
of fee denials
won
% won of cases won
21
45.6
0.33
33
50.8
0.45
26
48.2
0.24
409
56.9
0.24
59
58.4
0.40
29
63.0
0.24
515
65.5
0.42
236
51.3
0.09

Total
cases

46
65
54
719
91
46
786
460

Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 4, at 1473-79.
Some automobile cases involve a dispute about whether the claim involves an “automobile
accident” as defined by the Road Accident Victims Compensation Law, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 311, § 1
(1974–1975) (Isr.).
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27
52
1028

Tort, auto
Other
Total

11.0
43.7
38.9

0.41
0.25
0.29

218
67
1613

89.0
56.3
61.1

0.06
0.33
0.26

245
119
2641

Note: The numbers of observations for the “Proportion of fee denials” columns are fewer than the
numbers shown in the table due to a small portion of the cases in which fee outcomes could not be
definitively ascertained.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

Table 3 reports rates of fee denial by year and judicial district. Petah
Tikva and Tel Aviv consistently denied fee awards more frequently to
winning defendants than to winning plaintiffs. Nazareth, with its large
proportion of property cases, consistently denied fee awards more frequently to winning plaintiffs than to winning defendants. Nazareth judges denied
fees to plaintiffs in 68% of the property cases they won, with even higher
denial rates in cases between individuals. They denied fees to prevailing
defendants in only 16% of cases. In other districts, denial rates to prevailing
property case plaintiffs did not exceed 40%, and fee denial rates to prevailing defendants were all higher than in Nazareth. The other three districts
did not have a consistent pattern favoring plaintiffs or defendants. Change
in category mix does not appear to explain the changes. The difference
between fee denial rates in defendant wins was not statistically significant.
The differences in rates of fee denials in plaintiff wins did significantly
differ, with Nazareth as the source of the difference. Excluding Nazareth,
results for plaintiffs did not significantly differ by district (p=0.148). Over
the four years of the study, rates of fee award denials did not significantly
differ for plaintiff wins (p=0.169) or for defendant wins (p=0.316).
Table 3: Rate of Fee Denial by Judicial District, Prevailing Party, and Year

Judicial
District

Rate
Rate when when
Year of defendant plaintiff
decision
won
won

Be’er-Sheva
Be’er-Sheva
Be’er-Sheva
Be’er-Sheva
Haifa

2005
2006
2011
2012
2005

0.36
0.40
0.18
0.15
0.47

0.29
0.17
0.32
0.26
0.14

Haifa

2006

0.18

0.27

Haifa

2011

0.33

0.35

Haifa

2012

0.16

0.35

Judicial
District
Nazareth
Nazareth
Nazareth
Nazareth
Petah
Tikva
Petah
Tikva
Petah
Tikva
Petah
Tikva

Rate
Rate when when
Year of defendant plaintiff
decision
won
won
2005
2006
2011
2012
2005

0.28
0.31
0.11
0.27
-

0.55
0.69
0.46
0.57
-

2006

-

-

2011

0.31

0.19

2012

0.22

0.18
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2005
2006
2011
2012

0.34
0.41
0.25
0.38

0.15
0.10
0.29
0.28

Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv

2005
2006
2011
2012
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0.31
0.28
0.28
0.34
0.780

0.19
0.17
0.21
0.20
<0.001

Note: The Petah Tikva district court was created in 2007. The significance levels in the table test
for differences across districts, pool the data across years within districts, and account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

Because multiple factors may be associated with fee denials, regression
analysis helps assess whether the above results persist when explanatory
factors are taken into account simultaneously. Since the outcome variable
“fee denial” is dichotomous, we employ logistic regression.83 Tables 2 and 3
indicate that the prevailing party, case category, and district are all associated with fee denials. In the regression models, we add further controls for
plaintiff–defendant status (including public corporate status and foreign or
domestic status), the size of the recovery in cases won by plaintiffs, the time
a case took to resolve, and representation by counsel.84 Since RCP Rule 512
instructs courts to base their litigation cost rulings in part on the amount or
value of the relief requested and the remedy granted by the court, we also
included a variable for whether a plaintiff prevailed in whole or in part.
Table 1 shows that the government was the plaintiff in relatively few cases.
We therefore combined the government-plaintiff categories into a single
category of government as plaintiff without distinguishing among defendants by party status. We included dummy variables for years to assess time
patterns, with 2012 as the reference year. The sample contains decisions by
170 different district court judges, and we clustered the standard errors by
judge to account for the nonindependence of a judge’s decisions. We
modeled fee denials separately for cases in which plaintiffs prevailed and
cases in which defendants prevailed.
Table 4 reports the regression results. It supports using separate models,
as it shows that covariates often differ in size and significance based on the
prevailing party. Models (1), (3), and (5) include only cases won by plaintiffs
and models (2), (4), and (6) include only cases won by defendants. The
defendant-win models cannot include the recovery or “claim fully accepted”
variables as the recovery is always zero and the claim is never accepted. The
table reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the
83 See generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMICS USING
STATA 459-60 (rev. ed. 2010) (discussing logistic regression).
84 Parties can be awarded fees even when not represented by counsel.
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outcome variable. Marginal effects are interpretable as the change in the
probability of a fee denial given a one-unit change in an explanatory
variable. For categorical explanatory variables, this change in probability is
in comparison to a reference category—that is, a value of the explanatory
variable against which changes in the outcome probability are measured.
The reference category for the plaintiff–defendant/prevailing–party combinations, for example, is individual versus individual. This means that the
coefficients for the other plaintiff–defendant/prevailing–party combinations
in Table 4 indicate how much more or less likely a fee denial becomes
compared to the baseline case of a suit between two individuals. Jerusalem
is the reference category for judicial district in all four models. In models
(1) and (2), tort is the reference category for case categories.
Because Table 2 shows that tort cases are distinctive, we also constructed
models limited to nontort cases to assess whether the large group of tort
cases drives our results using the full sample. In models (3) and (4), which
exclude tort cases, the reference case category is the residual category
“other.” Model (5), which is limited to tort cases won by plaintiffs, shows
that fees were less likely to be denied to individuals prevailing against
corporations than to those prevailing against other individuals. Model (6),
limited to tort cases won by defendants, confirms the favorable treatment of
individuals: fees were least likely to be denied to individual defendants who
won against corporations (denial in one of twelve cases).
Table 4: Logistic Regression Models of Fee Denial to Winning Party
(1)
Pltf. won,
all case
categories
Recovery (log10)
Claim fully
accepted
Years pending
(log)
Pltf. represented
Deft. represented
Administrative
law
Arbitration
Banking
Contract
Corporations

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Deft. won,
Pltf.
Deft.
Pltf.
Deft. won,
all case
won,
won,
won, tort tort only
categories nontort nontort
only

-0.032***

-0.030***

-0.009

-0.212***

-0.139***

-0.011

-0.014
-0.181***
-0.107**

-0.009
-0.010
-0.129*

-0.018
-0.123**
-0.096**

-0.004
-0.013
-0.130*

0.198
0.197**
0.239*
0.144**
0.284***

-0.088
-0.210***
-0.262***
-0.087**
-0.126**

0.106
0.152*
0.105
0.085**
0.192**

-0.005
-0.154**
-0.231***
-0.016
-0.063

0.006

-0.107
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Expropriation
Property
Tort, auto
Other
Be’er-Sheva
Haifa
Nazareth
Petah Tikva
Tel Aviv
Ind. v. Corp.
Ind. v. Govt.
Corp. v. Ind.
Corp. v. Corp.
Corp. v. Govt.
Govt. plaintiff
Public corp. deft.
Public corp. pltf.
Foreign corp. pltf.
Foreign corp. def.
Case ended 2005
Case ended 2006
Case ended 2011
Observations
PRE
Pseudo r-sq.

0.007
0.229***
-0.049
0.257**
0.041
0.058
0.183***
-0.081**
-0.013
-0.073**
0.148**
0.014
-0.032
0.035
0.204**
0.151**
-0.004
-0.168***
0.160
-0.013
-0.020
0.024
1485
0.270
0.232

-0.038
-0.141***
0.001
-0.113**
-0.031
-0.050
-0.101
-0.063
-0.019
-0.004
0.015
-0.070
-0.060
0.022
0.014
-0.045
-0.196***
0.278*
0.165
0.085
0.008
0.013
1009
0.020
0.052

-0.064
0.181***

0.088
-0.061

0.009
0.007
0.155**
-0.083**
-0.024
-0.032
0.192***
-0.030
-0.055
0.134*
0.184*
0.074
0.000
-0.143***
0.357**
-0.011
-0.030
0.030
1256
0.381
0.223

-0.027
-0.023
-0.078
0.007
0.045
-0.053
-0.053
-0.025
-0.061
0.028
-0.002
-0.005
-0.158***
0.218
0.054
0.059
0.015
0.013
790
0.014
0.045
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0.050
0.015
0.068
-0.008
-0.014
-0.124***
-0.014
0.007
-0.023*

0.192
-0.114
-0.059
-0.230*
-0.185
0.082
0.113
-0.296***
-0.220*
-0.145
0.062

0.171
-0.015

0.012
0.060
0.013
230
0.048
0.225

0.180
0.337***
0.231**
-0.038
-0.006
219
0.182
0.107

Note: Dependent variable is whether winning party was denied attorneys’ fees. Standard errors,
not shown in the interest of space, are clustered by judge. PRE equals proportionate reduction in
error. * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

In the first two plaintiff-win models ((1) and (3)), the size of recovery is
negatively and significantly associated with fee denials. As damages increase, defendants were more likely to be ordered to pay fees. The coefficient on “claim fully accepted” in model (1) indicates that full acceptance of
a plaintiff ’s claim, in contrast with partial acceptance or denial of the claim,
is strongly and statistically significantly associated with a court ordering
payment of fees. Full acceptance of a claim decreases the probability of a
litigation cost denial by 21% in model (1) and by 14% in the sample of
nontort cases. This result can be interpreted as judges implementing RCP
Rule 512’s instruction to consider the degree to which a prevailing party
succeeded on its claims. An alternative measure of the degree of plaintiff
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success is the ratio of monetary recovery to the amount requested in cases
plaintiffs won. This variable is positively and statistically significantly
associated with awarding fees but is substantially collinear (correlation
coefficient > 0.50) with the recovery amount and is not included in the
models. The presence of counsel for either plaintiff or defendant is associated with fees being awarded, but this effect is sizeable and significant only in
the plaintiff win models. Neither the coefficients for time on the docket
(years pending) nor those for the year dummy variables is significantly
associated with fee denials in the models except for the tort case defendantwin model for cases ending in 2005.
1. Case Categories
In model (1), the coefficients for all nontort case category dummy variables are positive and most are statistically significant, indicating a higher
probability of fee denials when plaintiffs win nontort cases than when they
win tort cases. The sole negative case category coefficient is for a subcategory of tort cases, those involving automobiles. Model (2) shows that when
plaintiffs lost tort cases they tended not to be assessed their adversary’s fees.
In model (2), all nontort case category coefficients are negative, and several
are statistically significant. Model (4) shows that, excluding tort cases from
the analysis, arbitration and banking cases were significantly less likely than
the residual category (other) to deny fees.
2. Plaintiff–Defendant Combinations
When plaintiffs prevailed, the coefficients for the plaintiff–defendant
combination variables were modest in model (1) with the exception of a
significant 14.8% higher probability of fee denials when individual plaintiffs
prevailed against governmental entities than when individuals prevailed
against other individuals. This increased to 19.2% higher probability of
denials when one excludes tort cases in model (3). The fact that the rate of
fee denials is significantly lower when individuals prevailed against corporations is largely attributable to tort cases, since that effect shrinks to a 3.2%
lower probability of denials that is insignificant when tort cases are excluded
in model (3). The effect increases in magnitude to 12.4% and is significant in
tort cases, as shown in model (5).
When defendants prevailed in the full sample, public corporate plaintiffs
that lost were least likely to be absolved of paying fees. This effect persisted
at a substantial level, 15.8%, and was significant in nontort cases, as shown in
model (4). There were no instances of denials of fees when a public corporate
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plaintiff lost a tort case and that variable dropped out of model (6); fees
were allowed in all six such cases.
Models (1) and (3) show that when foreign corporate plaintiffs prevailed
they were significantly less likely to be denied fees than when domestic
parties prevailed. This result is based on a substantial number of cases. In
model (1), foreign corporate plaintiffs were denied fees in only three of sixty
cases; in model (3), there were denials in only three of fifty-two cases.
Model (3) also shows that when plaintiffs prevailed against foreign corporate defendants they were significantly more likely to be denied fees. This
result is based on fee denials in four of fifteen cases. Model (6) shows that
when foreign corporate defendants won, they were significantly more likely
to be denied fees than when plaintiffs won against domestic defendants. The
significant foreign corporate defendant effect in model (6) is based on
denials in three of five cases.
3. Districts
All three models of cases with prevailing plaintiffs suggest that the Nazareth district court was more willing to deny fees in such cases than other
district courts, though the significance levels varied. This is consistent with
Table 3, which showed Nazareth to have the highest rate of fee denials in all
four years. The significance of this effect did not persist in the tort model.
The high Nazareth denial rate largely stems from a 70.5% fee denial rate in
property cases won by plaintiffs, a rate much higher than that of any other
district. The denial rate variation across districts is smaller in property cases
won by defendants. The rate ranges from a high of 30.8% in Be’er Sheva and
33.3% in Petah Tikva to a low of 16% in Nazareth. Petah Tikva’s denial rate
for winning defendants in tort cases was the lowest of any district, 25% of
twenty cases, much lower than all districts other than Tel Aviv, which
denied fees in 29.3% of seventy-five cases.
B. Amount of Fee Awards
Since the amount of fee awards outcome is a continuous variable, one
can, for cases won by plaintiffs, use scatterplots to show the relation between fee awards and other continuous variables. We first show the relevant
scatterplots, which support using linear regression models, and then present
tables that show the relations among fee awards and categorical variables.
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the relation between fees and recoveries for
the three major case categories: tort, contract, and property. Figure 1d shows
the relation between fees and time on the docket for all cases combined. All
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amounts in the figure and elsewhere in this Article are in 2012 NIS adjusted
for inflation. The first three subfigures are traditional scatterplots, and
Figure 1d shows both a scatterplot and the locally weighted regression
(LOWESS) line85 that best fits the data. All of the subfigures show a
positive relation with fees. As expected, courts tend to award higher fees
when recoveries are higher and when cases take longer. The duration of
cases served as our proxy for the effort lawyers expended.
Figure 1: Relation Between Fees and Continuous Variables

Note: Amounts are in 2012 NIS.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

Table 5 shows, by case category, the mean and median fee awards, and,
in its last column, the median recovery. It shows similar median fee awards
for plaintiffs and defendants in administrative law, arbitration, banking,
contract, and property cases. Tort cases noticeably differ: mean fee awards
to prevailing plaintiffs are more than double the mean fee awards to prevailing
defendants, and median fee awards also substantially differ. In automobile
tort cases, the difference was substantially more extreme. Although fees to
85 See WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, T HE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 18, 168-80 (rev.
ed. 1994) (explaining the concept of a LOWESS line and its uses).
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tort plaintiffs were the highest, median monetary recoveries for plaintiffs,
shown in the last column, were higher in five of the ten case categories with
median recovery data.
Table 5: Fee Awards and Recovery Amounts, by Prevailing Party
and Case Category
Defendant won
Category

Admin. Law
Arbitration
Banking
Contract
Corporations
Expropriation
Property
Tort
Tort auto
Other
Total

N with
fee
award
15
26
21
161
25
7
153
97
13
30
548

Mean
fee
(000)
73
19
64
53
66
46
41
58
21
50
49

Plaintiff won
Median N with
Mean
fee (000) fee award fee
(000)
30
9
83
12
14
8
40
15
50
35
193
110
41
22
39
18
16
40
23
175
37
31
101
203
18
68
231
30
27
115
25
640
110

Median Median
fee (000) recovery
(000)
30
1681
8
NA
36
1499
35
1391
21
368
33
96
20
152
52
728
175
1309
47
1932
31
874

Note: Amounts are in thousands of 2012 NIS. The numbers of observations for the Median
recovery column are fewer than the numbers shown in the table’s N columns due to cases with
nonmonetary relief. Amounts exclude cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees
may have been awarded to the losing party. The number of observations for the median recovery
column differs from that number of observations shown for the fee awards.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

Table 6 shows mean and median fee awards for plaintiff wins and
defendant wins, organized by district. Its last column shows the median
recovery amounts in cases won by plaintiffs in which there was a monetary
recovery. Mean fee awards were higher for prevailing plaintiffs than defendants in all districts. Median fee awards were higher for prevailing plaintiffs
than defendants in four districts, were equal between plaintiffs and defendants in Tel Aviv, and were higher for prevailing defendants in Petah Tikva.
Table 5 suggests that these differences are sensitive to the case category mix
across districts, with tort cases being important in explaining the patterns.
The differences in median fees across districts are statistically significant, as
shown in the table's last row.
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Table 6: Fee Award and Recovery Amounts, by District
Defendant won

Plaintiff won

N with
fee
award
36

Mean
fee
(000)
27

Median
fee (000)
18

N with
fee
award
39

Mean
fee
(000)
141

Median
fee (000)
40

Median
recovery
(000)
999

Haifa

131

29

18

154

112

25

866

Jerusalem
Nazareth

63

59

25

63

128

47

1121

52
51

24
70

18
50

51
67

109
94

25
35

856
1820

Tel Aviv

214

64

41

246

111

41

1039

Total

547

49

25

621

113

35

1004

-

<0.001

<0.001

-

0.223

0.003

0.280

Category
Be’er-Sheva

Petah Tikva

Significance

Note: Amounts are in thousands of 2012 NIS. The numbers of observations for the Median
recovery columns are fewer than the numbers shown in table’s N columns due to cases with
nonmonetary relief. Amounts exclude cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees
may have been awarded to the losing party. Significance levels for means are based on a regression
model of the fee as a function of district with standard errors clustered by judge. Significance
levels for medians are based on bootstrap quantile regressions.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

Table 7 reports ordinary least squares regression results that model the
fee award, in cases with an award, as a function of the variables in Figure 1,
in Tables 5 and 6, and additional controls. Models (1) and (2) include all
case categories, and models (3) to (8) are limited to specific case categories:
tort, contract, and property. Models (1), (3), (5), and (7) are limited to cases
won by plaintiffs and models (2), (4), (6), and (8) include only cases won by
defendants. The recovery and “claim fully accepted” variables can be
included only in the plaintiff-win models. Individual versus individual is the
reference category for the plaintiff–defendant combinations. Jerusalem is
the reference category for judicial district. Finally, in models (1) and (2),
tort is the reference category for case categories. We again included dummy
variables for years to assess time patterns, with 2012 as the reference year,
and clustered the standard errors by judge to account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.
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Table 7: Regression Models of Fee Amounts
(1)
Pltf. won,
all case
categories

Recovery
(log10)
Claim fully
accepted
Years pending
(log)
Pltf. represented
Deft. represented
Administrative
law
Arbitration
Banking
Contract
Corporations
Expropriation
Property
Tort, auto
Other
Be’er-Sheva
Haifa
Nazareth
Petah Tikva
Tel Aviv
Ind. v. Corp.
Ind. v. Govt.
Corp. v. Ind.
Corp. v. Corp.
Corp. v. Govt.
Govt. plaintiff
Public corp.
deft.
Public corp.
pltf.
Foreign corp.
pltf.
Foreign corp.
def.
Year=2005

(2)
(3)
Deft. won, Pltf.
all case
won,
categories tort

(4)
Deft.
won,
tort

(5)
Pltf.
won,
contract

(6)
Deft.
won,
contract

(7)
Pltf.
won,
property

(8)
Deft.
won,
property

0.064***

0.113***

0.054***

0.040**

0.019

0.013

0.060

0.024

0.267*** 0.078

0.073**

0.066

0.156*** 0.118***

0.153***

0.084***

0.104

0.035

-0.031

0.214

0.050

0.078

0.011

0.094

-0.061

0.127

0.076

-0.076

-0.361**

0.176

-0.359***
-0.252
-0.135*
-0.190*
-0.326**
-0.217***
0.100
-0.053
-0.068
-0.139*
-0.055
-0.007
-0.086
0.098*
0.071
-0.101**
0.084
0.192*
-0.109
0.105

-0.241***
-0.082
0.037
0.159*
0.088
0.017
-0.192
-0.015
-0.097
-0.141*
-0.156**
0.153*
0.085
0.096*
-0.133***
0.101
0.223***
0.052
-0.075
0.066

0.360
-0.170
0.346
0.212
-0.189
0.197
-0.042
-0.466**
-0.057
-0.305
-0.099
0.117

-0.417*** -0.109
0.003
-0.058
-0.128 0.088
0.213
-0.056
0.245* 0.046
-0.024 0.265**
-0.284*** 0.387***
0.107
0.117
-0.004 0.189*
-0.080 0.490***
-0.337*** 0.011
0.390** -0.053

-0.097
-0.075
-0.269**
0.194
0.047
0.081
-0.371***
0.059
0.250***
0.149
-0.018
-0.037

-0.164
-0.127
-0.137
-0.032
-0.045
-0.106
0.019
-0.043
0.166*
0.119
-0.044
0.424***

-0.178
-0.127
-0.129
0.111
0.037
0.218**
-0.038
0.190
0.375***
-0.108
0.097
0.065

-0.045

0.031

0.135

0.004

-0.045

-0.022

0.477

0.084

-0.008

0.638***

-0.096

-0.144

-0.257*

0.265

-0.305

0.206

-0.260

0.042

-0.227*

-0.136**

-0.020

-0.372** -0.011

-0.144

-0.084

0.069

-0.011
0.449

0.048
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Year=2006
Year=2011
Constant

-0.047
-0.043
4.352***

-0.021
0.056
4.188***

-0.313* -0.124 -0.088 -0.014 0.100
-0.046
-0.107 -0.016 -0.116
0.059
-0.003
0.006
4.205*** 4.342*** 4.341*** 4.103*** 4.116*** 4.242***

Observations
R-squared

612
0.435

540
0.306

95
0.564

94
0.419

185
0.373

159
0.327

164
0.388

152
0.302

Note: Dependent variable is the amount of the fee (log 10). Amounts exclude cases in which there
was no defense and cases in which fees may have been awarded to the losing party. The plaintiffwin models include cases that plaintiff won in which no fee was awarded. Such cases have the fee
award recoded as zero (after the log transformation). Standard errors, not shown in the interest of
space, are clustered by judge. * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

All the plaintiff-win models confirm Figure 1’s associations between the
amount of the fee and the amount of the recovery, as well as between the
amount of the fee and the time a case was pending on the docket. The only
non-significant coefficients for the years-pending variable are for defendant
wins in tort and contract cases (models (4) and (6)), and those coefficients
are in the expected direction. The coefficients are conservative because the
models include cases that plaintiffs won in which no fee was awarded. Such
cases have the fee award recoded as zero (after the log transformation). In
models limited to cases with positive fee awards, the subset of cases shown
in the figures, the relationships between the continuous explanatory variables and the fee amount are substantially stronger. Unlike the models of the
existence of a fee award, the plaintiff ’s claim being fully accepted is not
significantly associated with the amount of the fee award. This finding
makes sense because the category “claim being fully accepted” provides no
information about the amount of the recovery, which, as discussed above, is
significantly associated with the amount of the fee award.
1. Case Categories
Model (1) confirms that fee awards tend to be higher in tort cases won
by plaintiffs, as suggested by Table 5. The negative sign on all of the nontort
case category variable coefficients indicates that tort, as the reference
category, has the highest fee awards after controlling for other factors such
as recovery amount, time on the docket, plaintiff–defendant combination,
and district. The other nontort case categories in model (1) do not significantly differ. Model (2) shows that the significantly higher fee awards in
tort cases do not persist when defendants win. The low fee awards reflected
by the coefficients for arbitration cases in both models (1) and (2) are likely
attributable to those cases’ simplicity and shorter time on the docket.
Arbitration cases were pending on average 1.9 years compared to 4.1 years
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for other case categories. Arbitration cases are often simpler than other
cases in that they do not address the merits of cases but rather procedural
flaws in the arbitration.
2. Plaintiff–Defendant Combinations
With respect to the fact of an award, Table 4 showed favorable treatment
of individuals who succeeded against corporations compared to individuals
who succeeded against other individuals. Model (1) shows a marginally
statistically significant effect for this party combination with respect to the
amount of fees. Model (3) shows that corporations that prevailed against
individual defendants in tort cases received significantly lower fee amounts
than individuals who prevailed against individual defendants. In the contract and property category-specific models of cases won by defendants,
model (6) and (8), and in the pooled categories in model (2), fee awards
were significantly higher for corporate defendants who prevailed against
corporate plaintiffs. Model (5) indicates that, in contract cases won by
plaintiffs, fee awards were highest against government defendants and the
next highest when individual plaintiffs prevailed against corporations. These
patterns of higher awards did not persist in contract cases won by defendants.86
3. Districts
In cases won by plaintiffs, all district coefficients in the full sample are at
most marginally statistically significant, and one cannot reject the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero. Model (2) shows that Petah Tikva had
the highest fee awards when defendants won, as suggested by Table 6, and
model (4) indicates that this is attributable to its high awards in tort cases
(though Tel Aviv had higher defendant fee awards in tort cases). The higher
awards are not attributable to cases that take longer. The median time on
the docket in Petah Tikva tort cases is shorter than in any other district: 2.6
years compared to about 4.2 years for other districts.
In tort cases, a time trend exists for cases won by plaintiffs. Model (3)
indicates that awards were lowest in 2005, higher in 2006 than in 2005,
higher in 2011 than in 2006, and highest in 2012. However, no general
increase in fee awards persisted across case categories.

86 Model (3) in Table 7 suggests that when foreign corporate plaintiffs prevailed in tort cases,
fee awards were significantly higher than in other cases. However, that estimate is based on only
four cases won by such plaintiffs.
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Table 8 shows the fee as a percentage of the recovery for each case category.
The median fee percent in contract cases was much smaller than that in the
two other major categories (tort and property). The existence of a common
rate of 20% in tort is confirmed by the table, and the standard deviation of
the fee percent in tort is substantially smaller than that in contract or
property. The tort standard deviation significantly differs from the property
standard deviation (p=0.021) but not from the contract standard deviation
(p=0.203).87
Table 8: Attorneys’ Fees as Percent of the Recovery, by Case Category
Category

Mean percent

Median percent

Std. dev.

N

Administrative law
Arbitration
Banking
Contract
Corporations
Expropriation
Property
Tort
Tort, auto
Other
Total

3.8
8.9
16.3
29.3
59.3
25.8
21.2
15.0
15.8
19.5

1.8
2.8
7.5
13.8
20.5
13.5
20.0
13.0
8.4
13.1

3.5
11.9
30.9
40.1
63.7
38.7
19.6
6.8
22.0
28.5

5
0
9
97
5
11
36
68
68
8
307

Note: This table excludes cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees may have
been awarded to the losing party.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

A natural question is whether attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the
recovery decrease as the recovery increases. A decrease has been observed in
U.S. class actions.88 But the fee and other dynamics of such litigation differ
from the mass of cases, such as those studied here. If fees primarily reward
effort, observing a declining fee percentage as the recovery increases is
likely. Required effort may plateau in that the same effort may be needed to
recover both an amount X and an amount substantially larger than X. The
facts and law that must be marshaled likely do not always increase with the

87 These significance levels are based on robust tests of the difference in the standard deviation
of the means.
88 See Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 3, at 263-64 (explaining that the data revealed a
scaling effect, or a fee percentage decrease as class recovery increases, in class actions). Our data
contain 30 class actions, nine of which were won by plaintiffs, and three of which reported
monetary recoveries.
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stakes of a case. However, higher stakes may induce greater effort, which in
turn may support a larger fee. Holding constant effort, does the fee decline
or increase as a percent of recovery? Figure 2 shows the relationship between the percent and the recovery. The percent declines as the recovery
increases, but the relation is absent in tort cases.
Figure 2: Fee Percent (logit)-Recovery Relation, by Case Category

Recovery (log 10)
Note: The logit transform is log(proportion/(1-proportion)) where “proportion” is the fee divided
by the recovery. Amounts are in 2012 NIS.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

The regressions in Table 9 model the fee, as a percentage of the recovery. They add to Figure 2’s information by controlling for effort through the
case’s time on the docket. Time on the docket can be a problematic proxy
for effort or complexity. A longer time can indicate manipulative procrastination on behalf of one of the parties (usually the defendant) or a heavy
workload faced by the judge. Nevertheless, we expect that, on average, those
cases that take longer require more effort. In addition, procrastination by
defendants may require added effort by plaintiffs to seek orders requiring
more expeditious action by defendants.
Preliminary models, not reported here, included the full array of plaintiff–defendant combination variables, district variables, and other variables.
They do not materially differ from the more parsimonious models in Table
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9. Time on the docket behaves as expected and is positive in all models. The
coefficient on recovery is consistently negative and is statistically significant
in three models. The scale effect is strongest in contract and property cases,
as suggested by Figure 2. The tendency to award fixed percentages in tort
may preclude model (2) from achieving statistical significance. In fact,
except for a few low-recovery/high-fee percent cases, the tort pattern in
Figure 2 shows no scaling effect. An unvarying fee percent cannot of course
decline as the recovery increases.
Table 9: Regression Models of Fee as a Percent of the Recovery
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

All case categories

Tort cases

Contract cases

Property cases

Recovery (log10)

-0.956***

-0.338

-1.218***

-1.466***

Claim fully accepted

-0.222*

-0.186

-0.463*

0.093

Years pending (log)

0.213***

0.204

0.341*

0.296

Administrative law

-1.769***

Banking

-1.262***

Contract

-0.812**

Corporations

-0.693

Expropriation

-0.521

Property

-0.507**

Tort, auto

-0.042

Other

-0.548

Constant

3.746***

0.120

4.395***

5.048*

Observations

293

67

93

34

R-squared

0.425

0.087

0.439

0.424

Note: Dependent variable is a logit transform of the fee as a proportion of the recovery. Excludes
cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees may have been awarded to the losing
party. Standard errors, not reported here, are clustered on judge. * indicates p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

V. DISCUSSION
We discuss two major issues in more detail. First is the issue with direct
implications for all legal systems. How does the Israeli system, with the
internationally dominant loser-pays norm, compare to the American rule?
Second, we discuss additional details of the system’s operation that should
be of interest in fee studies. These details are the tendency to reward case
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outcomes and effort and the system’s features relating to case category,
locale, and party status.
A. Loser Pays or Closer to the American Rule?
A major issue for loser-pays systems is whether they fully compensate
prevailing parties. Some believe that awarded fees are insufficient to cover
clients’ actual attorneys’ fees.89 The 31,000 NIS median fee to plaintiffs and
the 25,000 NIS median fee to defendants strongly support this perception.
Quantitative comparison of fees with amounts related to litigation are
striking. The 25,000 NIS median fee to defendants is approximately 1% of
the jurisdictional amount threshold for filing a case in district court, and the
plaintiff median is less than 2%. The plaintiff and defendant median fee
awards are less than half of the filing fee, 62,500 NIS, for the smallest
monetary claim (other than bodily injuries) that may be brought in district
court. The loser-pays norm does not lead to full compensation of prevailing
parties.
Although Israeli prevailing parties do not, on average, recover their full
litigation fees, it is unlikely that a single reason explains the shortfall. We
find little evidence that judges seek to undercompensate prevailing parties
by approving nonzero payments below known fees. When they wanted to
promote access to courts, judges had the simpler strategy of denying the
prevailing party any fees. Our data provide evidence that, in some case
categories, judges try to award the prevailing party (mostly plaintiffs) actual
attorneys’ fees. They did so in road accident claims when the plaintiff
prevailed. In such cases judges know that, in all likelihood, the plaintiff paid
his lawyer about 13% of the recovery as attorneys’ fees,90 and therefore they
awarded the plaintiff 13% of the recovery as fees. The same phenomenon
prevailed with regard to other tort claims in which judges appear to mimic
the market and award prevailing plaintiffs fees of about 20% of the recovery
(the routine retainer agreement in the market).91 In the four cases in which
retainer agreements were submitted to the court, the requested fee amount
was awarded.92 In the vast majority of cases, however, the judge lacked
information about the prevailing party’s fees, and so one cannot expect
awards to match the actual fees. Underestimation may be the norm to avoid

89 See LOVELLS, supra note 54, at 110 (“The legal fees ordered by the [Israeli] court are often
considerably lower than the actual legal fees incurred by the parties.”).
90 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text.
92 See supra 65 and accompanying text.
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windfalls to parties and, in the case of prevailing defendants, to avoid overdeterrence of litigation by parties with relatively low resources.
The substantial fraction of cases in which prevailing parties received no
fee increases the gap between winning parties’ fee expenditures and recoveries. This means that Israel’s loser-pays system, like many others, is not as
different from the American rule as a simple dichotomy suggests.
B. Further Perspectives on the System’s Operation
Putting aside characterizing the system as most consistent with one rule
or the other, Israel’s fee system has several salient features of national and
transnational interest.
The system in general rewards outcome and effort. The probability of
denying fees to winning plaintiffs was inversely related to the size of
recovery in cases won by plaintiffs and diminished when plaintiffs succeeded
in whole. Fee denials were not associated with a case’s time on the docket,
but the fee amount increased with both the size of the recovery and the time
on the docket. The denial decision was more associated with whether
plaintiffs fully prevailed than with the time that a case took. The denial
decision differed substantially for cases won by plaintiffs and defendants.
The fee system also has distinctive features relating to case category,
locale, and party status. These include the prominent role of contingency
fees in tort cases, the high rate of fee denials in Nazareth property cases,
and the favorable fee award rate for foreign corporate plaintiffs.
Fees in tort cases were one of the most distinctive features of the Israeli
system. When one accounts for win rates, plaintiff–defendant combinations,
and the amount of fees awarded, judges’ tendency to protect individual
plaintiffs in tort cases becomes even clearer. Table 10 shows the sum of the
fee award amounts in tort cases involving individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
won varying percentages of tort cases, as shown in the third column. They
prevailed in 55% of tort cases against individuals, 62% of cases against
corporations, and 19% of cases against the government. The sum of fees
awarded to plaintiffs always far exceeded the sum of fees awarded to
defendants, as shown in the fifth column. The percentage of fees paid to
plaintiffs consistently exceeded their percentage of wins. Plaintiffs received
90% of the fees in cases against individuals, 78.2% of the fees in cases
against corporations, and 65.1% of the fees in cases against government
entities. The last percentage is especially noteworthy because plaintiffs lost
the overwhelming majority of cases against government defendants yet
received almost two-thirds of the fees.
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The dominance of contingent fees in tort cases likely led judges to rarely
deny the fees when plaintiffs prevailed. The amounts judges awarded
suggests that judges include a premium to reflect the risk of zero payment
from a client when contingency lawyers lost. Both the high rate of granting
fees to prevailing plaintiffs and the amount of fee awards likely relate to the
contingency fee character of tort actions. Frequent denial of fees when tort
defendants prevailed effectively promotes access to justice by individuals
unlikely to be able to comfortably afford paying fees when they lose.
Table 10: Tort Case Fee Awards by Party and Winner

Winner
Individual v.
individual
Individual v.
individual
Individual v.
corporation
Individual v.
corporation
Individual v.
government
Individual v.
government

Parties’ win
rates in
cases with
fee data

Number of Sum of fee Percent of fee
cases won
awards
award amounts
with fee data
(000)
to plaintiffs

Pltf.

54.8

23

7672

Deft.

45.2

19

852

Pltf.

61.7

37

8489

Deft.

38.3

23

2363

Pltf.

18.9

7

1051

Deft.

81.1

30

563

90.0

78.2

65.1

Note: This table excludes cases in which there was no defense and cases in which fees may have
been awarded to the losing party. Amounts are in 2012 NIS.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012.

A second distinctive feature of the fee system was the high rate of fee
denials in Nazareth property cases. Nazareth’s ethnic composition may lead
to different kinds of property disputes than the typical disputes in other
districts. Nazareth has a higher proportion of Arab litigants and judges than
other districts. The higher rate of fee denials in Nazareth persisted across all
ethnic combinations of plaintiffs and defendants. When plaintiffs won in
cases involving individual plaintiffs and defendants, the Nazareth fee denial
rate was 75% for the 32 cases involving Arab plaintiffs and Arab defendants,
96% for the 25 cases involving Arab plaintiffs and Jewish defendants, and
71% for the 14 cases involving Jewish plaintiffs and Jewish defendants. No
Nazareth cases with the necessary information involved Jewish plaintiffs and
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Arab defendants. Each of these rates is higher than the corresponding rate
in Haifa, the only other district with substantial numbers of Arab property
litigants. Together, Haifa and Nazareth account for 89% of Arab plaintiff–
Arab defendant cases and 77% of Arab plaintiff–Jewish defendant cases. For
cases involving Arab plaintiffs and Jewish defendants won by plaintiffs, the
Haifa fee denial rate was 14% (2 of 14 cases). The difference from the 96%
Nazareth rate (p<0.001) is statistically significant. These results suggest the
need to dig deeper into the cause and nature of the property disputes in Israel.
A third notable result is the low rate of fee denials to foreign corporate
plaintiffs, as shown in models (1) and (3) of Table 4. Such plaintiffs were
denied fees in less than 15% of their wins. They were also highly successful
in winning cases, as they prevailed in 69% of 13 contract actions, 83% of 42
property actions, and 80% of 10 tort actions. Their rate of success against
individual defendants was 92% of 36 cases compared to 67% of 173 cases
brought by domestic corporations. Their rate of success against corporate
defendants was 75% of 44 cases compared to 59% of 324 cases brought by
domestic corporations. Since the decision to bring a case likely differs for
potential plaintiffs in a foreign forum than for potential plaintiffs in their
home country, we do not interpret these results as evidence that Israeli
courts favor foreign corporations. Such anti-local bias seems extremely
unlikely. A more plausible explanation is that foreign corporations, fearing
bias in an unfamiliar court system, are selective about the cases that they
bring in foreign countries and thereby achieve high win rates.93 Foreign
corporate litigants likely also have higher than average resources and quality
of lawyers.94
As a procedural matter, the Israeli practice of not submitting documentation
to inform the court about the time and effort spent on a case, despite the
former ISC Presidents Justice Barak’s and Justice Beinisch’s administrative

93 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American
Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1132-35 (1996) (explaining how data reflect the argument that
foreigners are more selective of cases they file in U.S. courts). In the United States, findings of
high foreign litigant success in one time period were not replicated in a later time period. See
generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before
and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441 (2007).
94 The roster of names of foreign corporate plaintiffs in our data suggest that they often are
large sophisticated international companies such as Audemars Piguet Holdings Ltd., Christian
Dior Couture, Daimler Chrysler AG, Disney Enterprises Inc., E.M.I. Records Ltd., Gianni
Versace S.P.A., Lloyd’s Underwriters, Levi Strauss & Co., Louis Vuitton Malletier, Microsoft
Corp., Nike International Ltd., Smith Kline Beecham P.L.C., Time Warner Entertainment
Company L.P., and Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC. We did not observe a similar high success
rate by foreign corporate defendants, who, unlike plaintiffs, do not choose the cases in which they
are involved.
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guidance,95 at first seems bizarre. One assumes that a judge cannot make an
appropriate fee award without information about time and effort. A possible
explanation is rooted in an agency problem against the background of a
lawyer cartel: fee awards are granted to the parties and not to the lawyers.
Thus, the lawyers do not stand to benefit from revealing the information
regarding actual fees and may even be adversely affected by such public
knowledge. Alongside this explanation for the phenomenon, one can also
justify the absence of documentation in light of the extra work it would add.
If the prevailing party submits information in support of a fee amount, the
losing party should be entitled to submit information in support of a
different, presumably lower, fee amount (for example, to prove that the
requested amount is not “reasonable, proportional and necessary for the
litigation”).96 This could lead to a second round of litigation in many cases,
with the dispute centered not on a case’s merits but instead on the appropriate attorneys’ fees. Secondary litigation became such a serious and costly
issue in litigation in England that a fee award table, based on the amount
recovered, was adopted to reduce fee litigation.97
CONCLUSION
Attorney compensation fuels litigation, yet surprisingly little systematic
knowledge exists about fee awards. Legal systems try to balance the desire
to hold prevailing parties harmless through fee awards while promoting
reasonable access to courts by not overly deterring reasonable claims.
English rule systems do this through exceptions to loser-pays rules and
through fee awards that do not cover the prevailing party’s actual fees. We
present evidence that Israeli judges usually awarded fees to prevailing
parties, often exercised their discretion to deny fees, and denied fees at the
highest rate in tort cases brought by individuals. Higher recoveries and
prevailing in whole were both associated with an increased probability of a
fee award. The loser-pays norm was not followed in property cases in
Nazareth, where fee denial to prevailing plaintiffs was the norm.
When fees were awarded, the median amount was equivalent to less than
$10,000. Prevailing parties thus usually do not receive their full litigation
fees and must pay their attorneys substantial amounts above the court
awarded fees. A loser-pays system with substantial rates of fee denials to
95
96

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See CA 6793/08 Loare Ltd. v. Meshulam Levinshtein Contracting & Eng’g Ltd. 1, 10
[2009] (Isr.).
97 See Fenn & Rickman, supra note 3, at 534 (“The Fixed Recoverable Costs Scheme (FRCS)
was itself a response to a growing concern about rising legal costs in England and Wales . . . .”).
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prevailing parties and low fee amounts when fees are rewarded may, in its
actual operation, be closer to the American rule than to the English rule.
Both the pattern of fee denials and the amount of fee awards in tort cases
suggest that judges took into account that contingency fees were the
common method for funding tort litigation. Tort, contract, and property
cases all showed a strong association between the size of the recovery and
the amount of the fee award. Outside of tort, where fixed percentages of
fees were the norm, fees declined as a percent of the recovery as the recovery
amount increased.

